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Abstract. We study the problem of computing all Nash equilibria of a subclass of finite normal
form games. With algebraic characterization of the games, we present a method for computing all its
Nash equilibria. Further, we present a method for deciding membership to the class of games with its
related results. An appendix, containing an example to show working of each of the presented methods,
concludes the work.
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1 Introduction
Game theory has become an important technique for analyzing interactions amongst players (rational de-
cision makers) in a competitive scenario, where each player tries to maximize his profit. A fundamental
concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium in which every player is satisfied with his move. The
concept was introduced by John Nash in his celebrated 1951 paper [1]. Nash also proved that every mixed
game has a Nash equilibrium. Nash’s proof was a pure existence proof, and did not indicate any methods
for computing Nash equilibria.
In recent years, however, the problem of computing Nash equilibria has gained prominence, and has gener-
ated substantial research literature. In this work we consider methods for computing Nash equilibria of finite
normal form games – games known to have finitely many solutions1 – that emphasize use of polynomial
algebra.
Nash equilibria of a game can be viewed as solutions to a system of equations and inequalities defined over
payoffs and strategies. More specifically, they are the states of the game in which no player can obtain a
more favourable outcome by a unilateral change of strategy. This system of inequalities can be converted
into a system of polynomial equations that we call the game system (GS). We adopt this characterization
of Nash equilibria and apply polynomial algebra as a computational framework. Note that the conversion of
inequalities to equalities causes GS to have more solutions then just the Nash equilibria. Our main objective
is to propose a method for computing all the Nash equilibria for a suitable subclass of finite normal form
1 For the class of games that we consider, Harsanyi[2] shows that all the equilibria of the game are isolated and are
odd in numbers.
2 R GANDHI AND S CHATTERJI
games, that serves as an alternate to existing numerical or algebraic methods.
Tight complexity bounds have recently been presented for the problem of computing an equilibrium for finite
normal form games.2 In the light of this and related results, it is of interest to focus on restricted classes of
games and develop methods for computing their Nash equilibria. This is also of value in terms of applications
of game theory in particular domains.
Another aspect of our work relates to is that of finding all Nash equilibria rather than a single one. From an
application perspective, this helps in better strategic decision making.
Algorithms for computing all Nash equilibria, characterized as solutions of GS, typically iterate the procedure
for a single solution(sample solution). In their investigation of these algorithms, McKelvey and McLennan
[5] raised an important question: Whether a method can be found for computing all the equilibria of the
input game, given a single equilibrium (referred to hereafter as a sample equilibrium), without repeating the
solution procedure for the sample equilibrium.
Motivated by the question raised by McKelvey and McLennan, and the tight complexity bound for comput-
ing an equilibrium, we consider the problem of computing all Nash equilibria of subclass of finite normal
form games. The subclass of finite normal form games that we consider have all integral payoffs and all irra-
tional equilibria. The class of games are called integer payoff irrational equilibria(IPIE) games. We develop
algorithms for computing all its Nash equilibria using a sample solution,3 thus answering McKelvey and
McLennan’s question in the affirmative for games in this class. We further present an algorithm for deciding
membership to the class of IPIE games.
Our overall philosophy is to exploit the Galois group of univariate polynomial in I of GS along with a single
sample solution to extend our knowledge about the remaining solutions of the GS, which include all the Nash
equilibria. It is known that knowledge of the Galois group does not presuppose knowledge of all the roots.4
In the remaining treatment, it is therefore usually assumed that the Galois group of irreducible univariate
polynomials in the the ideal I of GS is known.
The primary setting of our work remains the Galois theory over commutative rings [7]. Accordingly, several
subsidiary results of an essentially algebraic nature are derived in the course of our development. We also
briefly consider the possibility of games over finite fields.
1.1 Related Work
To our knowledge, a method for computing Nash equilibria of IPIE games with Galois groups has not been
considered earlier. An algorithm for fast decomposition of univariate polynomials, over the field of rational
numbers, with known Galois group is presented by Enge and Morain [8]. The algorithm decomposes uni-
variate polynomials with Galois or non-Galois field extensions. Segal and Ward [9] also considers the use of
known Galois group in the problem of computing weight distributions in irreducible cyclic codes. The use of
2 For n ≥ 2-player games [3] and [4] show that problem of computing an equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
3 A sample solution is a solution tuple of GS with all irrational coordinates.
4 A method for computing Galois group using Tschirnhaus Transformations is presented in [6].
SOME ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES OF A SUBCLASS OF FINITE NORMAL FORM GAMES 3
Galois group for computing roots of a polynomial is also mentioned in [10,11].
In our method, we consider systems of multivariate polynomials and their solutions. All the algebraic exten-
sions we consider are extensions of the ring of integers Z. Further, we are able to obtain results related to
games with payoff values belonging to a discrete set, a finite set or a finite field.
Existing methods for computing Nash equilibrium, such as the approach based on the Gro¨bner bases are
computationally inefficient. Homotopy continuation methods have the added drawback that they provide so-
lutions via approximation. The method presented in [12] is highly dependent on the probability distributions
chosen. Our method offers a reduction of computational time (compared to existing methods). Further, it
computes exact equilibria for a subclass of IPIE games.5
Section 2 outlines the underlying model for the class of games that we consider. Section 3 presents the
algorithm for computing all equilibria of IPIE games. Results related to the games are presented in Section
4. Issue relating to the computational complexity of the algorithm is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 outlines
a method for deciding membership to the class of integer payoff games. Section 7 presents our conclusions
and suggests directions for future work. An appendix, presenting detailed examples to show working of the
methods, concludes the work.
2 Underlying Model
In this section we give the underlying model for the class of games we are going to consider. The required
definitions have also been presented.
Definition 1. A strategic finite normal form game TS is a 3-tuple 〈N,Si, ci : i ∈ N〉, where, N is a non-
empty finite set of players, Si is a non-empty finite set of strategies employed by player i and for each player
i its payoff ci is of the form ci : ×k∈NSk → R.
Each player i’s mixed strategy ∆(Si) is a probability distribution on its set of pure strategies Si, i.e. from
Si player i chooses strategy j with probability x
i
j , where x
i
j ∈ ∆(Si). A finite normal form game with mixed
strategies and expected payoff αi : ×k∈N∆(Sk)→ R is called mixed extension TM of strategic game TS .
Let TM be a finite normal form game with n = |N | players. Each player i has ki ≥ 2 strategies, |Si| = ki.
We write K+ = ∑ni=1 ki and K∗ =
∏n
i=1 ki. A
i
j1j2...jn
denotes the payoff received by player i when each
player adopts strategy jm for 1 ≤ jm ≤ km and m = 1, . . . , n. The probability that player i chooses strategy
ji ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ki} is denoted by xiji ,
0 ≤ xiji ≤ 1. (1)
Moreover, for each player i,
ki∑
ji=1
xiji = 1. (2)
5 cf. Proposition 7.
4 R GANDHI AND S CHATTERJI
Expected payoff for player i,
αi =
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
n
jn
(3)
Definition 2. Given mixed extension of strategic game, mixed Nash equilibrium is an action profile {xiji} ∈
∆(Si) ∀i, ji such that each player’s mixed strategy maximizes his payoff if the strategies of the other players
are held fixed.
In a Nash equilibrium, the following holds:
αi ≥
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
ki−1∑
ji−1=1
ki+1∑
ji+1=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...ji−1jiji+1...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
i−1
ji−1
xi+1ji+1 . . . x
n
jn
,
for every ji ∈ Si and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(4)
The class of games that we consider can be defined as follows.
Definition 3. Finite normal form games with all integer payoffs and all irrational equilibria are called
Integer Payoff Irrational Equilibria(IPIE) game T .
It is clear that T ⊂ TM . Applying (1) and (2) to (4), we obtain a system GS of polynomial equations, called
game system,
xiji (αi −
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
ki−1∑
ji−1=1
ki+1∑
ji+1=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...ji−1jiji+1...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
i−1
ji−1
xi+1ji+1 . . . x
n
jn
) = 0,
for every ji ∈ Si and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(5)
The class of games that we consider has integer payoffs and so coefficient Aij1j2...jn ∈ Z. All equilibria of
these games are irrational and so (1) changes to
0 < xiji < 1. (6)
This changes (5) to
αi −
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
ki−1∑
ji−1=1
ki+1∑
ji+1=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...ji−1jiji+1...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
i−1
ji−1
xi+1ji+1 . . . x
n
jn
= 0,
for every ji ∈ Si and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(7)
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For the problem of computing Nash equilibria of IPIE games, we characterize games with a GS of the form
(7). For deciding membership to the class of IPIE games, we characterize games with a GS of the form (5).
Our convention is to write totally mixed real-irrational Nash equilibria as irrational Nash equilibria. Note
that all Nash equilibria of the game correspond to solutions of GS, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Next, we define some algebraic concepts required for our method.
Definition 4. Let G be a group and X be a set. Then an action of G on X is a function of form G×X → X.
We shall be specifically interested in the following situation.
Definition 5. [13] Let S be an extension of commutative ring with R, i.e.R is a subring of S. Let G be a
finite group acting as R-algebra automorphisms on S. Then we define SG as the subring
SG = {s ∈ S|∀σ ∈ G, σs = s},
and say that S is a Galois extension with group G, if
– SG = R, and
– for any maximal ideal m in S and any σ ∈ G\{1}, there is an s ∈ S such that σs− s /∈ m.
We now consider the particular situation when S is an extension of R of the form R(α) where α is a root
of a polynomial p(x) ∈ R[x]. It is known that the Galois group G of the extension S acts as a permutation
group on the roots of the polynomial p(x).
When Galois group acts on a subset of roots, due to group actions, we get the other elements of the set of
roots.6 A transitive group action by a Galois group on an element of the root set produces all other elements
of the root set. Transitivity of a group can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 6. A subgroup H ⊂ Sn is transitive if for every pair of elements i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, there is
τ ∈ H such that τ(i) = j.
A conjugate element of an element of a set is an element generated by a group action on the element. Set of
all conjugate elements of an element is called an orbit of the element under the action of a particular group.
Formally,
Definition 7. For every x ∈ X we put Gx = {gx : ∀g ∈ G}, and call it the orbit of x under G, or simply
G-orbit of x.
Orbit of an element under Galois group is called Galois-orbit of the element. If G acts transitively on X then
there is only one G-orbit, X itself.
For more game theoretic concepts refer [14], and for Galois theory related concepts refer Cox[15].
3 Method
In this section we present outline of an algorithm for computing all Nash equilibria of IPIE games. The
algorithm has two stages: a sample solution computation and the group action. Various methods for com-
puting a sample solution are presented in [5]. In this work we use a version of Multivariate Newton Raphson
6 Not necessarily distinct.
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method(MVNRM).
Over all approach of the algorithm is as follows: In the first stage compute a sample solution of the GS. Once
the sample solution is available, apply group action by Galois group to produce conjugate solutions of the
sample solution. Rejecting all non-equilibria solutions from the set of solutions gives all the equilibria of an
IPIE game.
Note that the input to the algorithm is an IPIE game, and Nash [16] gives existence of at least one mixed
strategy equilibrium(irrational equilibrium in our case). This implies that for each indeterminate variable,
we are guaranteed to get a polynomial irreducible over the base ring Z.
In the first stage, MVNRM starts with a guessed solution of the GS. For the class of games all the mixed
strategy Nash equilibria (probability tuples) form a subset of the set of solutions of GS. This allows choosing
an initial guess of a solution to be either all 0’s or 1’s or some value between (0, 1). The choice of a solution
tuple speeds up the convergence rate of MVNRM. Next we convert the approximate solution of GS into
algebraic form.
For constructing minimal polynomials of approximate roots, output of MVNRM is fed as input to the KLL
algorithm [17]. The KLL algorithm requires at leastO(d2+d·logH) bits of an approximate root for computing
its minimal polynomial, where d is the degree bound and H is magnitude bound of the coefficients of the
minimal polynomial. If we let (xk1, xk2, . . . , xkn) denote the approximate solution generated by MVNRM
in kth iteration, and xk =
√
x2k1 + x
2
k2 + . . .+ x
2
kn, then the bound on number of bits required by the KLL
algorithm sets the stopping criteria for MVNRM.
Proposition 1. MVNRM must compute approximate solution of GS till the number of zero bits in the binary
representation of |xk+1 − xk| is bounded above by O(d2 + d · logH).
Proof. MVNRM computes approximate roots of GS, which form the input to the KLL algorithm. Required
precision, (d2 + d · logH), for the input to KLL algorithm then immediately sets the criteria for the amount
of precision required by MVNRM. ⊓⊔
Bounds on the value of d and H can be obtained as follows. The variety of polynomials in a Gro¨bner basis
and the polynomial system are same (Hilbert’s Nullstalensatz). By change in a monomial order we can obtain
a univariate polynomial in the desired indeterminate variable. It is easy to see that the bound on number of
solutions of the system of polynomial equations also bounds the degree of each these univariate polynomials.
Each polynomial in a Gro¨bner basis of a polynomial system is essentially an S-polynomial. An S-polynomial
is constructed by taking modulus of all the polynomials with a pair of distinct polynomials, for every pair
of polynomials in the basis. Maximum value of coefficients in the GS then bounds the coefficient values
of univariate polynomials in a Gro¨bner basis of the GS. A univariate polynomial in each indeterminate
variable has a minimal polynomial as its one of the factors. And so the maximum magnitude of the coef-
ficient in the minimal polynomial is bounded above by the maximum coefficient value of the game system GS.
At the end of the first stage, the algorithm generates a sample solution of the GS.
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With the samples solution, available either in algebraic form or in numerical form, in the next stage of the
algorithm, we apply group actions by Galois groups G. These groups are associated with the irreducible
univariate polynomials in the ideal I of GS. Note that, we assume Galois groups are known. For IPIE games
the Galois groups are associated with ring extensions over Z, and they generate conjugate solutions of the
sample solution of the GS. The group action is transitive and produces a single orbit for each indeterminant
variable. Using all the orbits we can determine all the irrational solutions of the GS.
Recall that all the solutions of the GS need not be Nash equilibria. For rejecting unwanted non-equilibrium
solutions, we apply the Nash equilibrium verification algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1 Phase 1: Computing a sample solution of GS with MVNRM and KLL Algorithm
1: X ′ = {}. // Initialize an empty set to store a sample solution of the GS.
2: Characterize all the Nash Equilibria of the input game as solutions to the system of form GS.
3: while one sample solution of polynomial system GS is not constructed do
4: Apply MVNRM with a starting solution tuple x0 consisting entirely of zeros.
5: while inequality in Proposition 1 holds true. do
6: Compute approximate solution of GS.
7: end while
8: Apply KLL Algorithm and compute minimal polynomial.
9: if minimal polynomials of some of the indeterminate variables in the approximate solution tuple is
reducible over Q then
10: Divide GS with those factors and go to step Step 4 with the updated game system.
11: else
12: Save the solution tuple in X ′.
13: end if
14: end while
The following algorithm computes transitive Galois group action of every indeterminate on its corresponding
root in X ′. It then generates Galois-conjugates of roots and saves them in solution tuple at appropriate
position.
For the division by linear factor in Step 10, of Algorithm 3.1 we use multivariate polynomial division al-
gorithm from [18]. It is important to note that due to the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium and the
fact that all equilibria are irrational for the input game, we are guaranteed to get one solution of GS in
X ′ and so Algorithm 3.1 reaches Step 14 every time. Moreover, the finiteness of the group and the variety
on which it acts guarantees that the Algorithm 3.2 reaches Step 10. At the end of Step 10, Algorithm 3.2
generates solutions of the system GS in X , all of which may not be Nash equilibria. At last, for rejecting
non-equilibrium solutions, the polynomial time Nash equilibrium verification algorithm [19] is used.
Note that the method above computes solutions to a system of polynomial equation using its sample solution
and its Galois group. After the computation of a sample solution, all other solutions computed are without
factorization of the system of polynomial equations.
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Algorithm 3.2 Phase 2: Computing polynomial time Galois group action on the sample solution in X ′ to
generate solutions of GS.
1: Initialize processed-element list X and unprocessed-elements list U as X = U = X ′.
2: while U is not empty do
3: Let u be the first element of U . Delete u from U .
4: for each element g in Galois group G do
5: Compute transitive Galois group action ug.
6: if ug /∈ X then
7: X = X ∪ {ug} and U = U ∪ {ug}.
8: end if
9: end for
10: end while
4 Results
Observe that Step 9 in the Algorithm 3.1 rejects not only integer roots but rational roots. This forces
the polynomial system not to consider rational extensions over the ring of integers. Such rejections can be
justified with the following result.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2 cannot be used for computing all Nash equilibria of games
with integral payoffs and rational equilibria.
Proof. Let T be a game with integer payoffs and one or more rational equilibria of form a/b, where
a, b 6= 0 ∈ Z. This forces an extension S = Z(a/b) over Z. The group G of automorphisms of S which
fix Z can be computed as follows.
Let c, d ∈ Z, for any c+ (a/b)d ∈ S and for any σ 6= id ∈ G,
σ(c+ (a/b)d) = σ(c) + σ(a/b)σ(d)
= c+ σ(a/b)d,
and σ(a
b
· b) = a⇒ σ(a
b
)σ(b) = a⇒ σ(a
b
) = a/b⇒ σ = identity.
This means, the group of automorphisms of rational extensions of the ring of integers turns out to be a trivial
identity group. And so, the group doesn’t provide necessary information for producing conjugate solutions
of the GS. ⊓⊔
Now, in order to prove the validity of the proposed method for IPIE games, we establish 3 more results, as
follows:
Proposition 3. For any IPIE game its Galois group is non-trivial.
Proof. Any IPIE game, by definition, produce irrational ring extensions over the ring of integers Z. We first
show that each such extension produces a Galois extension. Let α = m
√
n, for m,n ≥ 2, be an irrational
number. Let p 6= nm be a positive prime integer.7 Then it can be verified that pZ(α) forms a prime and thus
7 It is easy to see that if p = nm then any element β ∈ pZ(α) is not a prime element.
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a maximal ideal of Z. We now choose a s ∈ Z(α) such that its co-prime to p. Following Definition 5, if we
let S = Z(α) and R = Z, then for any ρ ∈ G(S/R)\{1} and for chosen s, ρs− s /∈ pZ(α). This shows that
the extension is indeed a Galois extension.
Next, suppose the Galois group for the irrational extension Z(α) is trivial. Then the minimal polynomial of
m
√
n has all factors linear over Z, and hence α ∈ Z. This is impossible for IPIE games. And so the result
follows. ⊓⊔
The next result sets the criteria for the MVNRM to converge to a solution of a GS.
Proposition 4. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be the vector strategy tuple with each xi denoting a pure strategy for
the players and let f(x) = (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fn(x)), for all polynomials fi ∈ GS. Then MVNRM converges
to a sample solution of GS if the following condition holds: |f(x) J2(f(x))| < |J(f(x))2|.
Proof. In MVNRM, an approximation of the nth strategy tuple xn is computed using
xn = xn−1 − f(xn−1)
Jf(xn−1)
.
If we let
φ(x) = x− f(x)
Jf(x)
(8)
then for overall convergence of MVNRM we need | d
dx
φ(x)| < 1. Taking the derivative of (8) and simplifying
it, we get |f(x) J2(f(x))| < |J(f(x))2|. With this condition, MVNRM converges to a sample solution of the
GS. ⊓⊔
With the required tools in hand, we can now show the correctness of the method for computing all Nash
equilibria of IPIE games.
Proposition 5. Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 for computing all equilibria of IPIE games works. i.e. these algo-
rithms generate all irrational equilibria of IPIE game at termination - and they do not generate any spurious
solutions.
Proof. The input to the Algorithm 3.1 is an IPIE game T with n players. All the Nash equilibria of this
game are characterized by a polynomial system GS of the form (7). The polynomial system comes from the
inequalities on expected payoffs and payoffs at pure strategies. These inequalities cause the system to have
more solutions then just equilibria.
Algorithm 3.1 computes a sample solution of the GS using MVNRM and saves it in X ′. MVNRM computes
an approximate solution of the game system GS, starting with an approximate solution value either 0,1 or
1
2
. Nash [1] guarantees that a solution of GS exists in (0, 1). With the convergence criteria from Proposition
4, MVNRM converges to a solution tuple of GS. This may not be a sample solution. It is known that the
input game has only irrational equilibria. If there are integer or rational solutions, they are rejected with the
condition in Step 9 of the Algorithm 3.1. This guarantees a sample solution of GS. The polynomial bound
given in Proposition 1, on the amount of precision required for KLL algorithm, forces MVNRM to stop. KLL
algorithm computes the minimal polynomial for each root in the sample solution and terminates.
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Roots in the sample solution extend the ring of integers Z to some Galois extension S of it. This is due
to the Galois correspondence established by Chase et al. [7]. More so, irreducible polynomials of univariate
polynomials in ideal I of GS forces transitivity of Galois groups. This gives us a meaningful non-trivial
transitive Galois group G = Gal(S/Z).
The transitive group action has only one orbit. Polynomials that we consider are irreducible after elimination
of integer and rational roots. Due to our assumption that the Galois group of irreducible polynomials are
known, we get group action of a transitive group G = Gal(S/Z) on elements of set X ′ to generate all the
elements in set X . System (7) has finitely many real solutions and so the group action terminates. This
enables Algorithm 3.2 to reach Step 10. And so the algorithm generates all conjugate solutions of the sample
solution containing all Nash equilibria of game T .
The solutions of GS may be more than just the Nash equilibria. Unwanted solutions are further rejected by
calling a polynomial time algorithm to verify Nash equilibrium. What remains are all irrational equilibria of
the game T . And so the result follows. ⊓⊔
With the algebra and algorithms discussed above, we further ask, whether we can consider finite normal
form games with all irrational equilibria and all payoff values from either finite fields or some finite set. This
question can be partially answered as follows:
Proposition 6. The algebra and algorithms for IPIE games cannot be extended to work over finite fields
and their extensions.
Proof. If we define a finite normal form game over some finite number field, then the only polynomial
algebra that we can consider is congruent-modulo algebra. i.e. polynomial system of form (7) will be modulo
some prime or prime power. This forces the expected cost function codomain values to be restricted to the
finite number field. The payoff functions in games must provide every player a choice over his strategies by
suggesting an order between elements in the codomain, where the function maps strategies. It is known that,
finite number fields are not ordered fields and so they fail to provide a total order amongst player strategies.
Moreover, the available order over finite fields conflict with field operations and we cannot perform polynomial
algebra. So, we cannot meaningfully define games, and consider polynomial algebra such as suggested in the
Algorithms in Section 3 for computing Nash equilibria of such games. ⊓⊔
However, we can consider some discrete codomain of the payoff function such as the ring of integers with
total order or some finite set with arbitrarily defined total order and consider games over it.
Now, we consider a result that talks about computation of Nash equilibria in closed form. It is known that if
a polynomial defined over fields has a solvable Galois group, then all its roots can be computed with radicals.
If the result generalizes over rings then we can generalize the solvability by radical result. i.e. for some ring
S and a subring R the following holds:
R = Z = L0 ⊂ L1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Ln = S, (9)
and ∃ αi ∈ Li+1, a natural number ni, such that Li+1 = Li(ai) and αnii ∈ Li, then solvability by radicals can
be extended for a subclass of IPIE games. All finite ring extensions need not be radical. With this restriction
on the extension of the ring and the definition of Galois theory over rings, we have following result.
SOME ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES OF A SUBCLASS OF FINITE NORMAL FORM GAMES 11
Proposition 7. If the ring extensions associated with the IPIE games are radical then all the equilibria of
IPIE games can be computed in closed form.
Proof. Follows immediately from the discussion above. ⊓⊔
5 Computational Complexity
The characterization of equilibria as solutions to a system of polynomial equation is a polynomial time op-
eration in the size of input payoff matrix, where the size of the matrix is K∗. The while loop in side the
Algorithm 3.1 of Steps (3-14) runs until a sample solution of the GS is computed. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,K+} and
for each indeterminate variable xi, let di denote the degree of its univariate polynomial in I of the GS. The
while loop of steps (3-14) runs for at most d = maxi di times. Average case running time analysis of the
Newton’s method – for computing approximation of all the roots of a univariate polynomial – is studied by
Smale [20,21]. A sufficient number of the steps for the Newton’s method to obtain an approximate zero of a
polynomial f , are polynomially bounded by the degree di of the polynomial and 1/ρ, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the
probability that the method fails. Kuhn’s algorithm improves efficiency by a polynomial factor and provides
global convergence. On the other hand Renegar [22] studies the problem of computing approximate solutions
of multivariate system of equations using homotopy method and presents an efficient algorithm. Note that
these results on the complexity analysis has underlying assumption that the numerical method converges.
For the Algorithm 3.1, number of operations, for constructing a minimal polynomial and checking its irre-
ducibility over Q, are bounded by a polynomial in the size of degree d and maximum norm H of the minimal
polynomial [18]. The operation of multivariate polynomial division of Step 10 runs in O(M1 ·M2) time [23],
where each Mi is the maximum number of terms in the polynomials considered for division. Without loss of
generality we let M =M1 > M2.
With these details, we present the following complexity bound for computing a sample solution with the
Algorithm 3.1.
Proposition 8. Algorithm 3.1 runs polynomial in O(K+d(1/ρ+H + dH + cM)).
Proof. The while loop of (3-14) runs for at most d times. Considering the complexity of computing an approx-
imate root of each univariate polynomial with Newton-Raphson’s method, the MVNRM with Proposition 4
runs polynomial in O(K+d · 1/ρ). The KLL Algorithm runs in O(dH), requiring at most K+ repetition in
worst case. The operation of checking irreducibility of a minimal polynomial, in worst case, is required for
each indeterminate variable and for every factor of the univariate polynomials. The irreducibility check runs
polynomial in O(dH). Finally, the multivariate division is called with only a single root of the univariate
polynomial, making M2 a constant c. The division algorithm is also required for K+d times. Summing up
all and rearranging terms we get the result. ⊓⊔
We are not considering the issue of computing the Galois groups in this work, i.e. we consider that the
Galois groups are known. But to make the discussion complete, we give below, the complexity of computing
a Galois group of the given polynomial. Computation of a Galois group requires polynomial time in the size
of the input polynomial and the order of its Galois group. If f(x) has degree d then its Galois group can
have at most d! elements and so in worst case the computation takes exponential time. This is best know
upper bound due to Landau [24]. Lanstra [25] surveys computational complexity result of computing Galois
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groups and other related problems.
Once a Galois group G is completely known, we must find the Galois-orbit Gx of every known root x of
indeterminate variable in the GS. An orbit construction takes polynomial time with algorithm suggested by
Luks [26]. In the worst case, the algorithm requires action of each of the Galois group generator g′ ∈ G′ ⊆ G
to each element of the set of roots. This gives worst case time O(|G′|·|X |). Finally, the operation of verification
of a Nash equilibrium solution, runs polynomial in the size of total number of strategies K+.
6 Membership
With the characterization of games as game system GS, in this section we outline a method for deciding
membership to the class of IPIE games.
6.1 Method
The games that we consider are known to have integer payoff values and all irrational equilibria. The ir-
rational equilibrium solutions induce irrational ring extensions. With this property, an intuitive and naive
approach to answer the problem of deciding membership is as follows. Given an input game, we characterize
all its equilibria as solutions to the system of polynomial equations of form GS in (5). After the characteri-
zation we ask, whether for each indeterminate variable its univariate polynomial has linear factors over the
field of rational numbers or not.8 If the polynomial has no linear factors over Q, then we must verify whether
the solutions – consisting of linear factors of the polynomial over Q – are Nash equilibria of the input game
or not. If any of the solutions is an equilibrium then the game is a non-member to IPIE games. Otherwise it
is. For the polynomial irreducibility test over Q, we make use of a polynomial time univariate factorization
algorithm over Q from [18]. For constructing a univariate polynomial from multivariate system of polynomial
equation GS we use a Gro¨bner basis of the GS.
We start the membership decision with checking payoff values of the input game. If the payoff values are
non-integer then we declare the input game a non-member to the class of IPIE games. In the case otherwise
we do the following.
Note that the condition of checking irreducibility of each univariate polynomial over Q rather than Z lets us
use field algebra, providing a richer set of tools to work with.
Next, we analyze various possibilities of a root generation during the process of factorization of the univariate
polynomials in GS.
There are mainly five possibilities: (1). The first univariate polynomial in the Gro¨bner basis of GS has
complete linear factorization over Q. In this situation the game is a non-member. (2). The first univariate
polynomial has some linear factors over Q. Further, substitution of all these linear factors in the triangular
8 It is important to note here that the membership to the class of IPIE games can be decided by considering
irreducibility of the univariate polynomial over Q. Justification of this fact comes from the following: if a polynomial
has all its factor linear over Q, then its roots are either integers or rationals. If the polynomial has no linear factors
over Q then the roots are either irrational or complex. By [1] every game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
and so strictly a real number. This means that there is at least one irrational root of the polynomial.
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Algorithm 6.1 Algorithm for deciding membership to the class of IPIE games.
1: for each of the indeterminate variable (i = 1 to K+) do
2: Apply the Buchberger’s Algorithm with the lexicographical order (xi ≺ xj),∀j 6= i and compute a univariate
polynomial in the Gro¨bner bases of the GS.
3: For the univariate polynomial produced in Step 2, check its irreducibility over Q.
4: if the univariate polynomial has linear factors over Q then
5: Substitute each root in the triangular form of the Gro¨bner basis and compute a complete solution tuple
corresponding to the root.
6: if the solution tuple verifies to be a Nash equilibrium of the input game then
7: Declare the input game a non-member to the class of IPIE games and stop.
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: Declare the input game a member to the class of IPIE games.
form of the Gro¨bner basis produce univariate polynomials (in other indeterminate variables) with some linear
factors. The substitution process generates solutions tuples with rational and irrational coordinates. There
are two possibilities for each of these solution tuples. Either the solution is a Nash equilibrium or it is not. In
former case the game is a non-member while in later it may be a member. (3). The first univariate polynomial
has some linear factors but the subsequent univariate polynomials have all the irreducible factors over Q.
This case is subsumed in case (2) mentioned above. (4).The first univariate polynomial has all irreducible
factors over Q, and subsequent substitutions produce polynomials with rational or integer roots. This case
is also subsumed in case (2). Finally, (5). The first univariate polynomial has all irreducible factors over Q,
and subsequent substitutions produce all the roots that extend Q. In this situation, due to existence of at
least one mixed Nash equilibrium [16], we are guaranteed to get at least one irrational solution of the GS.
And so the game is a member.
The analysis above, of roots generation during the factorization in Algorithm 6.1, suggests that a solution
tuple with rational coordinates must be verified to be a Nash equilibrium. In this situation if it is guar-
anteed that substitution of an irrational root produce all irrational roots in subsequent substitution, then
the repeated factorization and verification of the roots can reduce. We call this condition the membership
condition. The condition will also improve efficiency of the membership algorithm.
In the following section, we present a result that improves running time of the membership Algorithm 6.1.
The result primarily focuses on an algebraic property of the ideal I of GS.
6.2 Result
In this section we present a result that allows us to decide membership to the classes of games with relatively
few root computation, factorization and verifications.
Proposition 9. If the polynomial ideal I of the game polynomial GS is zero-dimensional, radical and in
general position. Then for deciding membership to the class of IPIE games exactly one irreducible univariate
polynomial in the Gro¨bner basis of the GS is sufficient.
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Proof. If the GS over a field Z has following form
x1 − h1(xp) = 0
x2 − h2(xp) = 0
...
xp−1 − hp−1(xp) = 0
hp(xp) = 0. (10)
And if hp is irreducible over Z with 1 < deg hi < deg hp, 1 ≤ i < p. Then, for all i, root value of xi will
extend Z. This is a sufficient condition for the membership condition.
One of the ways to obtain the condition above for GS defined over some field F ⊂ Z is the Shape Lemma [27].
The shape lemma states: Let the ideal I of a polynomial system be a zero-dimensional ideal in F[x1, . . . , xn]
which is in general position with respect to x1, i.e. the projection of VK(I) onto the 1-st coordinate is
injective. Then
√I has a lexicographical reduced Gro¨bner basis with respect to xn ≺ . . . ≺ x1 of the form:
√
I = 〈gn(xn), xn−1 − gn−1(xn), . . . , x2 − g2(xn), x1 − g1(xn)〉
where gn is a square-free polynomial and the degree of every gi doesn’t exceed degree d of gn. K is algebraic
closure of F.
The requirement in the shape lemma gives us the required condition, and so the result. ⊓⊔
The result above throws more light on the structure of a game system GS for the class of games that we
consider. Moreover, it improves the computational complexity of Algorithm 6.1.
Next we present the correctness of the membership Algorithm 6.1.
Proposition 10. The Algorithm 6.1 for deciding membership to the class of IPIE games works.
Proof. Input to the Algorithm 6.1 is a finite normal form game characterized as GS of the form (5).9 All the
coefficients of the GS must be integral, otherwise the game is a non-member to the class of IPIE games.
In case all the payoff values are integer, then the for loop of Steps 1-10 executes. The other property, of
the input game, that we have to check is, whether all its solutions are irrational or not. For checking the
irrationality of each indeterminate variable in the GS, we must check whether its univariate polynomial has
all its factors irreducible over Q or not. To obtain a univariate polynomial in each indeterminate variable,
with different lexicographical orders, the Buchberger’s algorithm is called. Due to the finiteness of number of
equilibria solutions of the input game and Buchberger [28] we are guaranteed to get a univariate polynomial
every time.
For checking irreducibility of each of the univariate polynomials over Q, algorithm from [18] is used. The
polynomial time irreducibility check algorithm takes Algorithm 6.1 to Step 4 every time.
9 We recall that the type of games that we consider, in this work, are known to have finitely many equilibria solutions.
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For each of the linear factors of a univariate polynomial a solution tuple is constructed. These solutions are
then verified to be Nash equilibrium of the input game. If one of these solutions is a Nash equilibrium, then
the method stops with declaring the input game a non-member to the class of IPIE games.
With the finiteness of the following: degree bound of the degrees of the GS, the degrees of each univariate
polynomial and number of strategies, we are guaranteed to reach Step 10 of the Algorithm 6.1.
At the end of the for loop, univariate polynomials of all the indeterminate variables have all non-rational
factors and so the input game is declared a member to the class of IPIE games. ⊓⊔
Note that in the light of Proposition 9, the for loop in the Algorithm 6.1 must be run exactly once. And so
Algorithm 6.1 works with the condition in Proposition 9.
Running time of the Algorithm 6.1 is primarily dominated by the preprocessing task of constructing uni-
variate polynomials. The Buchberger’s algorithm for constructing univariate polynomials takes doubly ex-
ponential time in the number of indeterminate variables K+.
Our game system is of finite size in terms of degree, number of indeterminate variables and its norm. And so,
keeping aside running time of the Buchberger’s algorithm, the membership Algorithm 6.1 runs in polynomial
time. Further, Proposition 9 improves running time efficiency of the naive algorithm.
It is important to note that, the method for deciding membership does not assume that the Galois groups
are known. Also, for deciding the membership, the algorithm 6.1 does not compute all the solutions of the
GS.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we considered the problem of computing all the equilibria of a subclass of finite normal form.
Our intention was to use knowledge of a sample equilibrium for computing all the other equilibria. By defin-
ing the class of IPIE games, and presenting an algorithm for computing all its equilibria, we have addressed
the problem partially. For computing a sample solution we used MVNRM with the KLL algorithm. Though
MVNRM is not globally convergent but offers significant speed. For convergence guarantee we derived a
condition. With the use of KLL algorithm we computed equilibria in algebraic form contrary to traditional
approach of keeping solutions in approximation form. We also factored out unwanted roots during the sam-
ple solutions generation, keeping the MVNRM away from local minima. The sample solution computation
algorithm, with the convergence condition, is a definitive method for computing exact equilibria rapidly.
Further, for computing all the other equilibria we used knowledge of Galois groups. The assumption of known
Galois groups can easily be relaxed by adjoining an algorithm for computing Galois groups. Construction
of minimal polynomials using the KLL Algorithm and the use of Tschruhaus transformation over minimal
polynomials help relax the criteria.
Algorithm that we suggest for solving system of equation may not be time efficient for large problems in
practice, but it is time efficient compared to similar method based only on Gro¨bner bases. Algebraic approach
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that we consider in this paper throws more light on structure of solutions of class of games.
Based on the algebraic model in the Section 2, we presented an outline of a method for deciding membership
to the class of IPIE games. We also presented a result for improving efficiency of the naive method, and
presented the correctness of the membership algorithm.
The complimentary work to the presented work would be to prove a result concerning the existence of IPIE
games in general.
For the class of IPIE games, the algorithms we suggest are new and should be considered as precursor to
efficient algorithms in future.
8 Appendix: Example
In this section we present an example to show working of the algorithms presented. The input 3 players 2
strategy game is given by the following payoff matrix. The game is defined in [29].
A B
a 3, 0, 2 0, 2, 0
1 b 0, 1, 0 1, 0, 0
2 a 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
b 0, 3, 0 2, 0, 3
Table 1. Payoff matrix of a 3-player 2-strategy IPIE game. Player 1 and 2’s strategies are indicated by a, b
and A, B respectively. Player 3’s strategies are 1 and 2. Each entry in the matrix indicates player 1, 2 and
3’s payoff for their respective strategies.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote xi, yi and zi as player 1, 2 and 3’s ith strategy, respectively. First, we characterize
all the Nash equilibria of the game in Table 1 as solutions of the GS.
First we decide membership of the input game to class of IPIE games. After the characterization of all the
Nash equilibria of the game above, we apply the Buchberger’s algorithm to a generate univariate polynomial
in a Gro¨bner basis with lexicographical order z1 ≺ x1 ≺ y1 and get,
y41 + 7y
3
1 − 11y21 + 3y1 = 0. (11)
The polynomial has y1(y1 − 1)(y21 + 8y1 − 3) as its factorization over Q. Substituting rational roots in the
triangular form of the Gro¨bner basis we get (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1) as its two solutions with rational coordi-
nates. Verification of these solutions as Nash equilibrium of the input game reveals that neither constitute
an equilibrium of the game. We can repeat the procedure above for x1 and z1 with different lexicographical
order.10. We see that the ideal of the game polynomial for this game follows the shape lemma and so the
10 We do not require to repeat the procedure for x2, y2 and z2 because its a two strategy game.
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irreducible factor of indeterminate y1 guarantees that the game is a member to the class of IPIE game.
Next we apply equilibria computation algorithm for the game above and compute its equilibria using group
action. With the initial guess of the solution tuple consisting of all the 0’s, d = 2 and H = 3 we apply
MVNRM and compute an approximate sample solution tuple as follow.
x1 := 0.7282202113; y1 := 0.3588989435; z1 := 0.4717797888 (12)
Applying the KLL algorithm on the solution above generates univariate polynomials as follows.
5x21 − 16x1 + 9 = 0; y21 + 8y1 − 3 = 0; 5z21 + 4z1 − 3 = 0 (13)
These polynomials are irreducible over Z and has a Galois group {id,conjugate}, isomorphic to Z2. With
minimal polynomials, we compute a solution of the GS in closed form. Let one such solution be,
x =
1
5
(8 +
√
19); y = −4−
√
19; z =
1
5
(−2−
√
19). (14)
This is a sample solution of the game system. Next we perform Galois group action on the sample solution.
Once all the solutions are computed, we reject non-equilibria solution of the game with the polynomial time
verification algorithm [19]. This gives us the unique irrational equilibrium of the game depicted in Table 1,
x =
1
5
(8−
√
19); y = −4 +
√
19; z =
1
5
(−2 +
√
19). (15)
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